In LDK, there are various kinds of wolves in China's industry and corporate development: gambler-type rapid expansion of industries and enterprises, role-playing of the government in the private debt crisis, conflicts between economic development and livelihood, and internal management of family-owned enterprises. And so on, many typical problems faced by the development of Chinese enterprises are concentrated here.
According to legend, Peng Xiaofeng named his company "Levi LDK", which means "beyond the speed of light". The "DK" that goes beyond the conventional one means "winning qi". It can be imagined that Peng Xiaofeng, who was very vigorous at the time, placed great hopes on his company. But the reality is always embarrassingly embarrassing, following the unpaid wages in March, large-scale layoffs in April, the closure of suppliers’ debts in May, the government of Jiangxi giving up 2 billion in loans, and the recent government debt all the same. ... The current enterprise that is intended to transcend itself is entering a bottomless black hole and the future is uncertain.
This is a private enterprise that has had unlimited scenery. It has a glorious history of being successfully listed two years after its birth. It was once the world's largest solar wafer producer with the largest capacity, from upstream polysilicon silicon wafers and silicon wafers. The installation of batteries, components, and even terminals in the middle and lower reaches of the industry is entirely in the manufacturing mode of the entire industry chain. In places, it is the bank that talks about concessions without giving tea, and the mayor of the following officials cannot enter the factory. Peng Xiaofeng, the head of the company, once climbed to the top of China's richest new energy source. When the company's stock price was highest, it rushed to 76.75 US dollars. Of course, it is now less than 2 US dollars.
Nowadays, according to the official data released by LDK, as of the end of 2011, LDK’s debt reached 30.2 billion yuan, including an increase of 8.8 billion yuan in 2011. This amount, even for the whole Jiangxi Province, which has a population of 40 million, cannot be taken seriously. Once the company goes bankrupt, it will cause a lot of bank bad debts, and local governments will also be implicated. According to the company's first-quarter financial report, its operating loss reached US$136 million, and its net loss was US$185 million. The data for the same period of 2011 was operating profit of US$196 million and net profit of US$135 million, respectively. At present, multiple production lines at multiple plants at Sevi have already been suspended or partially shut down.
Is the story familiar? In fact, in the LDK LDK, we can see all kinds of wolves in the development of China's industries and enterprises.
First of all, Sevi is not alone in the pain. In LDK's body, there are alluding to the pain of China's hundreds of photovoltaic companies. From the European debt crisis and the US's "double reaction" caused by the external market shrink, the domestic demand market is not a climate, the new industry subsidies to stimulate excessive expansion of the industry, followed by excess. In the absence of self-discipline and lack of sustainable thinking, the photovoltaic industry is gradually becoming another labor-intensive manufacturing industry under the “new energy†halo. Among the companies involved, in addition to LDK, Suntech’s asset-liability ratio for the first time in the first quarter of this year climbed above 80% for the first time since 2005, and bank loans climbed from US$56 million at the end of 2005 to US$1.7 billion at the end of last year. Nearly 30 times. Other players such as Yingli, TRW, and even the entire industry are struggling to survive.
And leaving the industry aside, Zywi’s own aggressive gambler expansion is also a common problem for many Chinese companies. Especially when the enterprise develops to a certain level, it is difficult to control self-righteousness with entrepreneurs. From Xinyu, the land of origin, to Nanchang, Hefei, Suzhou, and Inner Mongolia, Seville’s expansion scale and speed are well-known in the industry. Peng Xiaofeng insists on the development of the entire industry chain. There is no problem with the development ideas. The problem is that it does not meet the cooperation of the time and place. In 2009, the industry crisis that began to show up was not completed so quickly. With the crisis in 2011, the market The recovery is even more distant. The radical expansion strategy coordinated by the loss of time finally dragged the huge Seville into trouble. In fact, it is not only Levi, but there are many similar examples. Alibaba.com, economic hotels, and Hanting hotels on the Internet are all verifying this point. Excessive rapid expansion is often a stumbling block to the continued development of a successful company.
The most prominent and most criticized point in the event was the role of the local government.
Whether it is the establishment of an early 200 million yuan in government borrowing and bank loans, the nanny care of low land and electricity prices, or the tilt of policies and funds in the economic stimulus plan, it is doomed that the destiny of the local government and the private enterprise is firmly established. Tied together. It is not difficult to understand that in the follow-up debt crisis, the role of local governments has become more and more important. They have even used provincial and municipal government budgets to cover their debt crisis, and eventually developed to the point where people are guilty of adversity. China seems to have been the same since ancient times. The development of a company seems to be entangled with the government forever, or the entanglement of the interests of the plain or the dark, so that the enterprise and the local government have formed an interdependent relationship. Seville may have demonstrated to us the way of the survival of private enterprises in the new era. But we need to reflect on how far the local government’s hands should go. What role should the government play in corporate communications? How should the government actually support the development of enterprises, how to formulate industrial development plans, and how to help enterprises resolve risks?
Not only is the government deeply involved, what is even more worrying is the bank that cannot get out. Relevant materials show that as of the end of the first quarter of 2012, the balance of loans provided by more than a dozen financial institutions and two local state-owned enterprises to Saiwei was as high as 12.885 billion yuan, of which short-term loans with a term of not more than one year were as high as 8.267 billion yuan. It is said that CDB provided 1.505 billion yuan in mortgage loans and 300 million yuan in credit loans, totaling 1.805 billion yuan; Shanghai Pudong Development Bank gave 1.51 billion yuan in credit loans; Construction Bank gave 547 million yuan in mortgage loans and 876 million yuan in credit loans. Once the huge debt crisis of LDK is out of control, banks will bear the brunt. This situation is undoubtedly forcing banks to seriously consider how to face the government-supported industry companies, how to maintain prudence under the initial investment impulses, and how to support enterprises and economic development under the premise of balancing risks and benefits.
In addition to the above, there are still many issues that China’s companies will never be able to hide, such as environmental protection. In the day when people’s environmental awareness exceeds imagination, the conflict between corporate development and people’s livelihood becomes more and more common. From the turmoil of the original Dalian PX project to the subsequent Shifang incident in Sichuan and the recent incident in Jiangsu’s Qidong, all are the game between the development of enterprises and local economies and the protection of people’s livelihood. And Sevi here, in the face of the province's second largest taxpayer, to solve the employment of 24,000 businesses, the people are unanimously hope that its collapse. Also out of fear of pollution, the price of the high-tech zone in which Levy was located has been declining every year, from 3,000 to 1800-1900 yuan per square meter per square meter, and nobody is interested in it. This anti-trend vision can explain many problems.
Of course, the most common problems faced by our private companies are also missing from Sai Wei, whether they have already been framed, or are being framed or not yet framed. Private enterprises in China have more or less natural grass-roots ignorance. They do not know whether or not they are not allowed to take the lead. However, this kind of grass-roots and modern enterprise management theories always have various conflicts. Like Seville, enterprise development is like a big tree, and the management system is as simple as Beijing's drainage. However, this family-style enterprise management model always lacks scientific and reasonable comparison with modern enterprise management framework. Risk control and self-rescue capabilities. The most difficult thing to understand is that this traditional model has always been in the struggle of modern enterprise management models. This is far from Huang Guangyu of Gome, Ng and Changjiang of NVC Lighting, and countless private enterprises and their leaders. Verified by yourself.
The LDK's current game of course has its own personality problems, but the common problems in the development of Chinese companies reflected in it are even more clear. Fortunately, today's LDK is far from those ordinary private enterprises that have broken through, and it is not built on private lending companies in the air. Whether it is in the industry or the strength of the enterprise itself, it is determined that it will not be like Liren. After dying, the transformation of the industry and the introspection of the enterprise, if it can be reached in time, is still a heroic drama that is worth the wait. Maybe this is just another robbery of LDK, but this road is doomed to be long. However, whether it is the course of Savi along the way, or looking forward to the future of the Jedi, it will be a vivid case of the development of private enterprises in China. There are many things that can be learned from it.
According to legend, Peng Xiaofeng named his company "Levi LDK", which means "beyond the speed of light". The "DK" that goes beyond the conventional one means "winning qi". It can be imagined that Peng Xiaofeng, who was very vigorous at the time, placed great hopes on his company. But the reality is always embarrassingly embarrassing, following the unpaid wages in March, large-scale layoffs in April, the closure of suppliers’ debts in May, the government of Jiangxi giving up 2 billion in loans, and the recent government debt all the same. ... The current enterprise that is intended to transcend itself is entering a bottomless black hole and the future is uncertain.
This is a private enterprise that has had unlimited scenery. It has a glorious history of being successfully listed two years after its birth. It was once the world's largest solar wafer producer with the largest capacity, from upstream polysilicon silicon wafers and silicon wafers. The installation of batteries, components, and even terminals in the middle and lower reaches of the industry is entirely in the manufacturing mode of the entire industry chain. In places, it is the bank that talks about concessions without giving tea, and the mayor of the following officials cannot enter the factory. Peng Xiaofeng, the head of the company, once climbed to the top of China's richest new energy source. When the company's stock price was highest, it rushed to 76.75 US dollars. Of course, it is now less than 2 US dollars.
Nowadays, according to the official data released by LDK, as of the end of 2011, LDK’s debt reached 30.2 billion yuan, including an increase of 8.8 billion yuan in 2011. This amount, even for the whole Jiangxi Province, which has a population of 40 million, cannot be taken seriously. Once the company goes bankrupt, it will cause a lot of bank bad debts, and local governments will also be implicated. According to the company's first-quarter financial report, its operating loss reached US$136 million, and its net loss was US$185 million. The data for the same period of 2011 was operating profit of US$196 million and net profit of US$135 million, respectively. At present, multiple production lines at multiple plants at Sevi have already been suspended or partially shut down.
Is the story familiar? In fact, in the LDK LDK, we can see all kinds of wolves in the development of China's industries and enterprises.
First of all, Sevi is not alone in the pain. In LDK's body, there are alluding to the pain of China's hundreds of photovoltaic companies. From the European debt crisis and the US's "double reaction" caused by the external market shrink, the domestic demand market is not a climate, the new industry subsidies to stimulate excessive expansion of the industry, followed by excess. In the absence of self-discipline and lack of sustainable thinking, the photovoltaic industry is gradually becoming another labor-intensive manufacturing industry under the “new energy†halo. Among the companies involved, in addition to LDK, Suntech’s asset-liability ratio for the first time in the first quarter of this year climbed above 80% for the first time since 2005, and bank loans climbed from US$56 million at the end of 2005 to US$1.7 billion at the end of last year. Nearly 30 times. Other players such as Yingli, TRW, and even the entire industry are struggling to survive.
And leaving the industry aside, Zywi’s own aggressive gambler expansion is also a common problem for many Chinese companies. Especially when the enterprise develops to a certain level, it is difficult to control self-righteousness with entrepreneurs. From Xinyu, the land of origin, to Nanchang, Hefei, Suzhou, and Inner Mongolia, Seville’s expansion scale and speed are well-known in the industry. Peng Xiaofeng insists on the development of the entire industry chain. There is no problem with the development ideas. The problem is that it does not meet the cooperation of the time and place. In 2009, the industry crisis that began to show up was not completed so quickly. With the crisis in 2011, the market The recovery is even more distant. The radical expansion strategy coordinated by the loss of time finally dragged the huge Seville into trouble. In fact, it is not only Levi, but there are many similar examples. Alibaba.com, economic hotels, and Hanting hotels on the Internet are all verifying this point. Excessive rapid expansion is often a stumbling block to the continued development of a successful company.
The most prominent and most criticized point in the event was the role of the local government.
Whether it is the establishment of an early 200 million yuan in government borrowing and bank loans, the nanny care of low land and electricity prices, or the tilt of policies and funds in the economic stimulus plan, it is doomed that the destiny of the local government and the private enterprise is firmly established. Tied together. It is not difficult to understand that in the follow-up debt crisis, the role of local governments has become more and more important. They have even used provincial and municipal government budgets to cover their debt crisis, and eventually developed to the point where people are guilty of adversity. China seems to have been the same since ancient times. The development of a company seems to be entangled with the government forever, or the entanglement of the interests of the plain or the dark, so that the enterprise and the local government have formed an interdependent relationship. Seville may have demonstrated to us the way of the survival of private enterprises in the new era. But we need to reflect on how far the local government’s hands should go. What role should the government play in corporate communications? How should the government actually support the development of enterprises, how to formulate industrial development plans, and how to help enterprises resolve risks?
Not only is the government deeply involved, what is even more worrying is the bank that cannot get out. Relevant materials show that as of the end of the first quarter of 2012, the balance of loans provided by more than a dozen financial institutions and two local state-owned enterprises to Saiwei was as high as 12.885 billion yuan, of which short-term loans with a term of not more than one year were as high as 8.267 billion yuan. It is said that CDB provided 1.505 billion yuan in mortgage loans and 300 million yuan in credit loans, totaling 1.805 billion yuan; Shanghai Pudong Development Bank gave 1.51 billion yuan in credit loans; Construction Bank gave 547 million yuan in mortgage loans and 876 million yuan in credit loans. Once the huge debt crisis of LDK is out of control, banks will bear the brunt. This situation is undoubtedly forcing banks to seriously consider how to face the government-supported industry companies, how to maintain prudence under the initial investment impulses, and how to support enterprises and economic development under the premise of balancing risks and benefits.
In addition to the above, there are still many issues that China’s companies will never be able to hide, such as environmental protection. In the day when people’s environmental awareness exceeds imagination, the conflict between corporate development and people’s livelihood becomes more and more common. From the turmoil of the original Dalian PX project to the subsequent Shifang incident in Sichuan and the recent incident in Jiangsu’s Qidong, all are the game between the development of enterprises and local economies and the protection of people’s livelihood. And Sevi here, in the face of the province's second largest taxpayer, to solve the employment of 24,000 businesses, the people are unanimously hope that its collapse. Also out of fear of pollution, the price of the high-tech zone in which Levy was located has been declining every year, from 3,000 to 1800-1900 yuan per square meter per square meter, and nobody is interested in it. This anti-trend vision can explain many problems.
Of course, the most common problems faced by our private companies are also missing from Sai Wei, whether they have already been framed, or are being framed or not yet framed. Private enterprises in China have more or less natural grass-roots ignorance. They do not know whether or not they are not allowed to take the lead. However, this kind of grass-roots and modern enterprise management theories always have various conflicts. Like Seville, enterprise development is like a big tree, and the management system is as simple as Beijing's drainage. However, this family-style enterprise management model always lacks scientific and reasonable comparison with modern enterprise management framework. Risk control and self-rescue capabilities. The most difficult thing to understand is that this traditional model has always been in the struggle of modern enterprise management models. This is far from Huang Guangyu of Gome, Ng and Changjiang of NVC Lighting, and countless private enterprises and their leaders. Verified by yourself.
The LDK's current game of course has its own personality problems, but the common problems in the development of Chinese companies reflected in it are even more clear. Fortunately, today's LDK is far from those ordinary private enterprises that have broken through, and it is not built on private lending companies in the air. Whether it is in the industry or the strength of the enterprise itself, it is determined that it will not be like Liren. After dying, the transformation of the industry and the introspection of the enterprise, if it can be reached in time, is still a heroic drama that is worth the wait. Maybe this is just another robbery of LDK, but this road is doomed to be long. However, whether it is the course of Savi along the way, or looking forward to the future of the Jedi, it will be a vivid case of the development of private enterprises in China. There are many things that can be learned from it.
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The first PLC, model 084, was invented by Dick Morley in 1969.The first commercial successful PLC, the 184, was introduced in 1973 which was designed by Michael Greenberg.
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